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by Ronald H Filler
Introduction
The use of give-ups is a very common practice in
today's global futures markets. However, over the past
two months, this practice has received considerable
attention and has been the subject of great debate as to
whether any changes to give-up procedures are needed
after the bankruptcy collapse of Griffin Trading Company ("Griffin"). Griffin, a U.S. futures commission
merchant, also operated through a branch in London.
According to various sources, one of its customers
placed a large order on EUREX through an executing
firm . This trade resulted in a loss of several million
dollars, thus forcing Griffin to file for bankruptcy. As of
March 1, many issues, especially those issues involving
the comparability of global bankruptcy and segregation
laws, still exist and are fit subjects for another article.
However, because the actual trade that caused Griffin's
bankruptcy involved a give-up transaction, this article
will address issues surrounding give-ups and whether
any changes to give-up practices are needed in today's
global marketplace.
Give-ups occur when a firm, known as the Executing Broker, executes a futures order on behalf of a
futures customer, and then transfers or "gives up" the
fill to the customer's cleari~ firm , known as the
Clearing Broker, to process or clear the order in the
respective customer's futures account. If the customer's
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account is managed by a Commodity Trading Advisor
or some other third party money manager (collectively
referred to here as a "CTA''), then the CTA places the
order with the Executing Broker who in turn allocates
the order to the respective Clearing Broker. If the CTA
clears its futures accounts among many clearing firms ,
then the Executing Broker would allocate the fills
among all of the Clearing Brokers. As you can see,
the execution and processing of these orders can be
burdensome and requires thoughtful and timely
communication among the parties to prevent and
minimize potential problems associated with clearing
give-up trades. This process also requires an agreement.
(continued on page 3)
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L etter from the Editors:
Congress Looks into Futures & Derivatives
The impeachment proceedings are over and,
finally, members of Congress are back at work looking
at the more important public issues. In an effort to
advance that process, the Senate and House Agriculture Committees held a Public Policy Roundtable on
February 25 and 26, to discuss futures, derivatives and
related public policy questions. Philip M. Johnson of
Skadden, Arps and Robert Wilmouth, President of the
National Futures Association moderated the discussion. The panelists included representatives from all
sectors of the futures and derivatives industry, including banks, exchanges, investment banks, former
regulators and professors. Senator Richard Lugar CRIN), Chairman of the Senate Agricultural Committee
and Representative Larry Combest (R-TX), Chairman of
the House Agricultural Committee, initiated the seminar.
The roundtable's objective was to educate congressional members, staff and other interested participants
on the issues facing the futures and derivatives industry. Senator Lugar and Senator Peter Fitzgerald (R-IL)
were in attendance throughout the proceedings as was
CFTC Chair Brooksley Born and other CFTC commissioners and division directors.
The seminar's agenda was extensive and exhaustive. It covered everything from an overview of the
derivative markets to technology, systemic risk issues
and customer protection. After nine hours of discussion, the panelists were asked by Bob Wilmouth what
was the one change they wanted in the commodity
laws and regulations. The overwhelming response was
to remove "legal uncertainty" associated, with swaps
(which is code for eliminating or modifying the Trea' repeal of
sury Amendment). The runners-up were the
the provision in the Johnson/Shad accord that prohibits futures on narrow stock indices and individual
stocks and parity between U.S. and foreign exchanges.
Each one of these issues is significant and we believe
Congress should address these points in the upcoming
reauthorization process.
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(continued from page 1)
One other issue, that although mentioned numerous times throughout the hearing, did not make the
top three list. That issue is the permanent establishment of the CFTC. Currently, the CFTC's tenure is
subject to a "sunset" provision every four years.
Unless Congress affirmatively "reauthorizes" the
agency it could go out of business by operation of
law. As several panelists pointed out, the CFTC is tlie
only agency that has a sunset provision.
There is no question whether the CFTC will be
reauthorized. That is a given. After twenty-five years,
the agency has performed a valuable service to the
public and should be made a "full " member of the
agency club. In addition, significant economic benefits
can be realized if reauthorization is eliminated. This is
evident from the amount of time and effort the CFTC
staff spends in preparing for the process. In conversations with former staff members, it is clear that the
process causes a huge drain on an already overtaxed
and overburdened agency.
One of the panelists, Tom Russo of Lehman Bros.,
argued at several times during the proceedings, that
perhaps futures and derivatives regulations should be
written on a tabula rasa (or is it tabula "Russo"). If we
were given this tabula rasa, line one would be the
permanent authorization of the CFTC. This change
would not amount to an unchecked "free ride" for the
CFTC as oversight jurisdiction by the House and
Senate Agriculture Committees would remain.
While the roundtable was a learning experience,
the process has a way to go. As Senator Fitzgerald
commented at the conclusion of the Seminar, although
he had only been in the Senate for fifty days, this was
the most intellectual debate that he had observed.
Let's hope that the debate continues on that level.

***
Editors N ote: We are pleased to announce that
Susan C. Ervin has joined FDLR's Board of Editors.

Also, Board member Dennis Klejna has become
General Counsel of Refco, Inc.
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Give-Up Agreements
The Futures Industry Association ("FIA"), together
with the Managed Futures Association ("MFA"), established two versions of a Uniform Give-Up Agreement
in 1995, both of which are now universally accepted
by most brokerage firms and end users. One version,
known as the Trader Version, is the principal Give-Up
Agreement used today. This version, although structured as a four party agreement, permits the Trader,
typically a CTA, to sign the Give-Up Agreement on
behalf of, and thus bind, its underlying futures customers. In fact, paragraph 2 of the Trader Version
specifically states that the Trader has represented that
it "is expressly authorized by Customer to enter into"
the Give-Up Agreement on behalf of its customers.
However, in some rare situations, the Customer itself
will sign the Give-Up Agreement.
The other version, known as the Customer Version, is a three party agreement, whereby the actual
Customer signs the Give-Up Agreement. No CTA or
third party is involved in the placement of the order
on behalf of the actual customer; the Customer places
the order directly with the Executing Broker.

Popularity of Give-Ups
Give-ups became popular several years ago when
the managed futures industry recognized the need for
simplicity and efficiency in the execution of orders that
would eventually be cleared by several clearing firms.
A CTA who managed multiple customer accounts that
were cleared at 10-15 clearing firms, found it difficult
and burdensome to place orders directly with each
clearing firm. Instead, the CTA would use one firm to
execute orders for all of its accounts and then requested this single Executing Broker to allocate the
trade fills among the various Clearing Brokers. More
recently, it has become a popular method as CTAs (and
Customers) started to trade globally. Some clearing
firms did not have a presence overseas. Also, the more
sophisticated CTAs recognized the need to execute the
futures order through the same firm in which it did its
cash business or which had a strong floor presence,
even though that firm was not its global futures
clearing firm. Thus, the execution business flourished,
and execution and clearing became two separate and
distinct functions on the global futures markets.
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firms is communication. The CTA (and the Customer)
has a requirement, even a duty, to communicate the
allocation of such fills and to inform the respective
Clearing Broker of executions made through another
firm during the business day. Failure to provide this
information timely can result in trades not being
processed properly among the actual customer accounts or being held overnight by the Executing
Broker. This can result in systemic issues as the
Executing Broker must now post margin for an account
that it has neither received margin funds from or has
contracted with. Also, the Customer does not post
margin funds with its Clearing Broker for such trades
as the Clearing Broker has not "received" the fill from
the Executing Broker. This was a problem in the
Griffin matter.

Allocation of Orders
Historically, a CTA who trades for multiple accounts must promptly notify, at or prior to the execution of the order, the Executing Broker as to how the
fills are to be allocated among the respective customer
accounts it is managing. Last summer, the CFTC
adopted the "post trade allocation" rule (Reg. 1-35(a1)(5)), which permits a CTA to communicate such
allocation after the execution of the order, but by no
later than the end of the respective business day,
provided the CTA has met certain tests. They are:
•

•

•

•

The CTA must qualify as an "eligible account
manager" (e.g., registered as a commodity trading
advisor with the CFTC or as an investment adviser
with the SEC or certain foreign advisors);
The CTA employs an allocation system that is
sufficiently objective and specific so that the
allocations can be verified in an independent audit
to be "fair, equitable and non-preferential";
The CTA sends a disclosure to all of its customers
prior to placing the first such order that states in
essence: (i) the general nature of its allocation
methodology, (ii) the fairness standard of its
allocations, (iii) the ability of its clients to review
summary or composite trading among its customer
accounts, and (iv) whether any accounts in which
the CTA might have an interest would be included
in the allocation;
The CTA provides a list of its "eligible customers"
who qualify for this post trade allocation to its
clearing firm (the term "eligible customer" is
defined in this new CFTC rule and is in essence
the same type of customer that meets the standard
set forth in Part 36 for "eligible swap participants.")

In the preamble to the Federal Register release in
which the "post trade allocation rule" was adopted, the
CFTC stated that "the requirement that the account
manager identify eligible customer accounts to the FCM
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should enable the FCM to insure that allocations are
made only to those eligible customer accounts." This
language has resulted in substantial debate as to what
obligations, if any, does a clearing FCM have to insure
that only "eligible customer accounts" have participated in an order involving a post trade allocation
when the CTA itself has the burden to make sure that
only such eligible customers are included in the post
trade order.
In recent meetings with senior CFTC staff, it
appears that, if a CTA only executes for customers, all
of whom meet the "eligible customer account" definition, then the clearing FCM has no obligation other
than, as noted above, to receive a list of those eligible
customer accounts from the CTA. If, however, some of
the accounts cleared through tl1e FCM and managed by
the CTA do not meet this definition, then the FCM
might have some additional responsibility to review
these orders. There is no exact method or procedure to
be undertaken by that FCM to complete that review.
Also, how often the review takes place might vary as
well.

Regardless of when orders JJre allocated to the respective
customer accounts, a bigger and more important issue is
the need for the aA (or Customer) to communicate in a
timely manner to its Clearing Broker that it has placed an
order for execution through another firm or person.
However, the clearing FCM, applying procedures it
believes meets a best practice approach, could perform
some or all of the following steps:
• Request a copy of orders or the blotter used by the
CTA to determine whether any non-eligible customer accounts were included in any post trade
order placed by that CTA;
• Review the trade registers provided by the exchanges which provide some type of identification
regarding post trades (it appears that both the
CBOT and the CME might be prepared to provide
soon an identification, such as a 'P,' on any such
post trade orders); and
• Check its floor order tickets or those of executing
brokers if a give-up trade occurred, to make this
same determination, etc.
Regardless of when orders are allocated to the
respective customer accounts, a bigger and more
important issue is the need for the CTA (or Customer)
to communicate in a timely manner to its Clearing
Broker that it has placed an order for execution
tl1rough another firm or person. If the Clearing Broker
is not aware that such order has been executed, then it
cannot look to the Executing Broker for the fills or to
the Customer for margin funds. This can only create
administrative problems as well as financial risks.
Thus, each CTA (or Customer) must understand its
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responsibility to communicate such information
promptly to its Clearing Broker.

Exchange Rules - Need for Change
Some exchanges have rules that require Executing
Brokers to notify the Clearing Broker within a particular time period and to have all required account
information so that the Executing Broker directly
inputs the trade information into the clearing house
·system that is eventually confirmed by the Clearing
Broker. Also, the major U.S. exchanges, and LIFFE in a
non-mandatory way, provide for an automated payment system of the executing fees or floor brokerage.
This automated floor brokerage payment system must
be adopted by all exchanges worldwide that permit
give-ups to take place.
It is also impo1tant that the exchanges establish
rules that govern the responsibilities of all parties-the
Executing Broker, the Clearing Broker and the CTA/
Customer-regarding give-up trades. By establishing
exchange mles regarding this conduct, then all parties
are fully aware of their respective duties and obligations. Give-Up Agreements would be unnecessary
other than to establish the execution fee. Such exchange rules, however, must be uniform. A Give-Up
Task Force could be established, which would include
representatives from the major international exchanges, the brokerage community, CTAs and other
end users, to establish a global uniform exchange giveup rule. Therefore, all issues relating to such obligations and responsibilities would be resolved in advance of any execution.

Needed Changes to the Give-Up Agreement?
What changes are needed to the Give-Up Agreements established in 1995 by the FIA and MFA after the
explosive growth of give-ups in general and the Griffin
matter in particular? The simple answer is none.
The Agreements have not created any problems
relating to give-up trades nor did they exacerbate the
Griffin matter. Both versions of the Give-Up Agreements provide language that permits the Clearing
Broker to establish trade limits with respect to any
order placed by a CTA (or a Customer). While most
Clearing Brokers do not establish these limits, they are
permitted to do so. The are many reasons why such
limits are not provided; the most important one is that
they would be difficult to establish. For example,
Clearing Broker XYZ limits ii' Customer to 500 CBOT
Treasury Bond contracts in its futures account. The
Customer now wants to execute through three Executing Brokers. The Clearing Broker could not restrict all
three Executing Brokers to 500 contracts each; thus,
the Customer could in theory place up to 1,500 contracts (500 contracts at each of the three Executing
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Brokers) . Similarly, the Clearing Broker could not
establish limits equal to 167 contracts in each Agreement (e.g., three times 167 contracts equals approximately 500 contracts) as this may not be particularly
fair as well.
What is needed is the duty and the obligation for
both the CTA/Customer and the Executing Broker to
notify the Clearing Broker promptly (e.g., within a
certain time frame) that an order has been executed on
behalf of the CTA (or Customer). This does not suggest
that the allocation be necessarily given within that time
frame, only that the fill be reported within that time
period. Therefore, the Clearing Broker will know,
within a short time, that such an order has been
executed. This should give the Clearing Broker sufficient time to assess the trade and whether any further
action needs to be taken (e.g., whether the CTA or
Customer has exceeded its margin requirements and
thus be forced to liquidate some or all of the trades at
issue) .

The [Uniform Give-Up} Agreements have not created any
problems relating to give-up trades nor did they exacerbate the Griffin matter.
Communication is required whether it be an
exchange with open outcry or an electronic trading
system. Hopefully, all electronic trading systems will
someday be structured in a manner whereby the
Clearing Broker knows instantaneously that an order
has been placed by a CTA (or Customer) which would
be cleared through the Clearing Broker, but this
information does not exist today-and it should. The
Task Force should also establish best practices for
electronic trading systems and open outcry, so that
these systemic issues can have minimal effect.
Query, what could have been prevented had
Griffin officials known early on that its customer had
placed such a large order? The Give-Up Agreement was
not the issue, although one may or may not have
existed. The real issue was the lack of communication
and the movement of the market during this information blackout. Information needs to be communicated
so that adequate risk management procedures are
established to prevent another such occurrence. You
can not legislate against this practice, whether it be on
the open outc1y or electronic trading system marketsyou can only establish proper and adequate procedures to minimize any adverse impact.
Thus, orders can and should be allowed to be
given up, but so should the information surrounding
them. Early communication is the best risk management tool the global futures industry can have with
respect to give-ups ■
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